increases in the total tax revenue for the state, and stimulating economic activity are in fact a reality.
This article will provide an overview of the Pennsylvania film tax credit program and question whether the perceived benefits of film tax credits are in fact a reality, and whether the legislature should continue to support the program.
THE NATIONAL EXPLOSION OF STATE FILM TAX INCENTIVES
State film tax incentives have exploded in popularity in the last decade. As television and film industries grew through the 1990s, so did the concern over "runaway productions," television shows and films that are intended for a United States audience but are filmed in other countries in order to reduce production costs. 7 The issue of runaway productions heightened after Canada adopted a movie production incentive program in 1997, 8 sparking an interest in U.S. states to introduce their own incentive programs in the hopes of getting a piece of the Tinseltown pie. In 2000, only four states offered subsidies. 9 Today, forty-five states and Puerto
Rico offer film incentives including tax credits, rebates, and exemptions.
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THE PENNSYLVANIA FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM
The Pennsylvania Film Production Tax Credit (FTC) Program is classified as an economic development tool, which is used to cultivate and develop the film industry in Pennsylvania. 11 The initial program, authorized under Act 55 of 2007, provided a tax credit equal to twenty-five percent of a film production's "qualified Pennsylvania production expenses"
for film productions where at least sixty percent of the total production budget is spent in Pennsylvania. 12 In its first year, the program cost $75 million, $42 million in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, and $60 million in the 2010-2011 fiscal year.
13
On June 30, 2012, legislators approved another $60 million for film tax credits after voting on state tax rates, and increased the credit up to thirty percent for those filming at soundstage facilities in Pennsylvania that have at least 7,500 square feet of clear production space. 14 They also approved the credits to be granted over multiple years, allowing the credits to be issued to television series for the first time. 15 Prior to this change, "only one-off television
productions, such as reality shows and cooking shows, have been eligible for the credits."
16
In order to participate in the tax credit program, filmmakers complete and submit an application package to the Pennsylvania Film Office. Upon review, they are preapproved for a certain amount of tax credits. Once production begins, filmmakers are required to report to the Pennsylvania Film Office at the end of each month and upon the completion of the production, filmmakers are mandated to submit a series of reports. While it is tempting to say that Pennsylvania can and should try to create economic diversity by developing and supporting a film industry until it can sustain itself without a tax credit program, a closer examination of the policy reveals three major problems: (1) it is difficult to predict the production's actions if no tax incentive was available, (2) the race against other state's incentive programs to attract productions creates a never-ending battle, and (3) reports are and Crew Form, and a Project Audit for projects in receipt of film tax credits $100,000 or greater or a Report on Agreed Upon Procedures for projects with tax credit less than $100,000). 18 Id. 19 McDonald, supra note 7, at 109. 20 Christopher Breakwell, The Film Tax Credit Works, and Western Pennsylvania is a Winner, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/the-film-tax-credit-works-andwestern-pennsylvania-is-a-winner-630732/. 21 Id. ("Since the program's inception, nearly $242.5 million in state tax credits have been approved and/or awarded to film production companies, which has resulted in estimated total economic activity of $1.8 billion and the creation and sustaining of almost 14,500 jobs statewide."). 22 Howard, supra note 13.
finding that the program generates a net loss of tax revenue for the state, and does not create the purported numbers of jobs.
THE "BUT-FOR" PROBLEM AND TRANSFERRABLE CREDITS
For some productions, Pennsylvania is the most attractive filming location, with or without the tax credits. Its urban, suburban, and rural landscapes, coupled with four distinctive seasons, make Pennsylvania an ideal location for a variety of films even without the tax credit incentive. 23 Thus, any tax credits for these productions are a waste. This problem has been referred to as the "but-for" problem: it is not possible to know what each production would have done but for the incentive.
24
The collected data regarding the use of tax credits from the FTC may suggest that a majority of productions would have chosen Pennsylvania regardless of the tax credits. As mentioned, with transferrable tax credit, the production company may sell its remaining tax credits to other Pennsylvania taxpayers. 25 In the 2011-2012 fiscal year, sixty-eight production companies sold, transferred or redeemed film production tax credit certificates with a total worth of $65.7 million. 26 Ninety-eight percent, or $64.3 million in tax credits were either sold or transferred to another entity, with just $1.4 million used by the initial tax credit recipient to reduce its Pennsylvania tax liability.
27
What is so telling about these figures is that local media and lobbyists in favor of the FTC of their line of business. 32 The recipients of these transferrable tax credits consist of wealthy individuals, financial institutions, and large insurance companies that can use the credits to reduce their taxes on premiums.
33
The analysis of the unused and transferred tax credits suggests that when producers receive tax credits for films that they would produce in Pennsylvania absent the incentive, the credits do little but transfer wealth from the taxpayer to production companies or worse, to affluent third-parties.
FUTILE COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES AND LEGISLATURE'S ECONOMIC INEPTNESS
Tax incentives have also become a basis of competition among the states because of a "race to the lowest bidder at almost any cost to the state in the name of sparking economic increased their subsidies from $4 million in 1999 to $1.4 billion in 2010. 37 Third, the number of films that get released each year is finite and, in fact, is steadily declining.
38
Along with the decline of the number of films produced each year, some economists and academics are starting to question the "sure bet" of investing in the film industry. 39 The increasing accessibility of television and film via affordable cable television and the Internet gradually displacing cable television represents an ease of access to film and television which was never known before during a time of economic adversity. 40 This increasing reality has been taken into serious consideration by several state legislatures, both those with existing tax incentives and those that have not yet adopted any kind of film industry incentive.
41
In conjunction with the arms race between the states is the oddity of lawmakers acting as economists. In creating the FTC program, the Pennsylvania legislature boasts that it can competently anticipate which industries will thrive. Unfortunately, economists generally agree that "lawmakers have little to no success at creating a business cluster where one does not already exist." 42 If anything, the fact that film production is becoming more dispersed and more mobile, with Hollywood struggling to maintain its status as the center of the film industry, should be a major indication that Pennsylvania has a long way to go before it reaches the status of becoming a major center for the film industry. Pennsylvania's legislators should not lose sight of the future of the film industry as a whole when determining if the interests of the Pennsylvania taxpayers will be met by trying to establish this new industry, the same idea that forty-five other states have as well. Moreover, Pennsylvania should not be fooled into thinking that other states will not continue to try to outbid Pennsylvania's incentives. 47 Pennsylvania must recognize that this type of antagonism is economically harmful to the state, and while big productions can bring large sums of money into its local economy, policymakers are obligated to explore uses of state funds which may provide greater and more consistent returns.
48
THE REAL COST OF PENNSYLVANIA'S FILM TAX CREDITS
Arguably, the largest problem with Pennsylvania's FTC program is the lack of transparency and impartial analysis of the actual costs of the program. Since the program's inception, nearly $300 million in state tax credits have been approved/awarded to film production companies over the past five fiscal years. These companies, in turn, have directly injected well over $1.4 billion into Pennsylvania's economy, generated an estimated $2.7 billion in total economic activity, and supported nearly 18,000 jobs.
49
As a starting point, in order to justify the FTC, its advocates would have to show that the price of the tax credits in terms of the lost revenue is lower than the benefit received. However, even the most favorable accounting of the FTC admits that the program results in a net loss of tax revenue for Pennsylvania. 50 But how is this possible when the production companies have "directly injected well over $1.4 billion into Pennsylvania's economy"? 51 The problem is that the film industry and some state film offices have carried out or contracted biased studies, finding that film tax credits are highly cost-effective drivers of economic activity. 52 Conversely, the most impartial and cautious studies find just the opposite. 53 Additionally, a large hurdle in assessing the costs of the FTC is the confusion between public and private costs, and the benefits of the credits. Statements in the media concerning the benefits of the FTC program typically stress the increases in private sector activity (restaurants, hotels, etc.) and measure them against the public sector cost, often without mentioning the consequent lowering of other public expenses to offset the lost revenue from the credit. This comparison creates confusion about the impact of the credit on the budget. While it is true that film incentives induce new productions resulting in private spending, the revenue generated from this new economic activity does not raise more money than the cost of the incentive to break-even or even generate enough revenue to offset a significant portion of the cost. 55 Also, there is the aforementioned issue of transferrable tax credits, resulting in the tax credits not being limited to a production's actual tax liability. Because productions are permitted to sell or transfer tax credits to third-parties, Pennsylvania is losing revenue from those thirdparties, and policymakers cannot maintain that the FTC program only forgives tax liability that would not have existed anyway. 56 Further, these studies often do not account for the simple but significant fact that some productions would likely have located to Pennsylvania without the tax credits. In fact, the majority of film productions have not applied for the FTC, suggesting that the actual response to the tax credit is likely well below the purported estimations. 57 Finally, the media and the supporters consistently refer to the number of jobs created by the FTC. However, this argument is problematic because the jobs that the supporters are referring to are mostly low-skilled, temporary jobs with little upward mobility. 58 The failure to account for the temporary nature of many film jobs leads to greatly exaggerated job creation estimates. 59 Professional and special skilled jobs are often outsourced, with the individual production are merely jobs that have shifted. For example, "a hairstylist might go from serving the public to crimping and curling on film sets." 61 These are just examples of how the lack of impartial reports regarding the FTC has created unfounded benefits popularized by the media and local film organizations. A closer look at the real costs of this program is necessary in order for Pennsylvania to decide if the FTC is really a strong state program. 
CONCLUSION
